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Onymity promotes cooperation in social
dilemma experiments
Zhen Wang,1,2 Marko Jusup,3* Rui-Wu Wang,4,5* Lei Shi,6* Yoh Iwasa,7
Yamir Moreno,8,9,10 Jürgen Kurths11,12,13
One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives
despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical
scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying
several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity,
and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments with anonymous and
onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of
cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation
between players’ ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental
shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that
reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing








Why is cooperation so prevalent in nature? After all, Darwinian selec-
tion should result in individuals pursuing their own selfish interests (1).
However, cooperation not only prevails, but its mass emergence is the
main force behind the evolutionary transitions from single-cell orga-
nisms to complex animal and human societies (2). To systematically
analyze the fundamental trade-off faced by individuals who choose be-
tween cooperating and free-riding behaviors,mathematiciansM.M. Flood
and M. Dresher devised in the 1950s a model of conflict and coopera-
tion known as Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (3). In each realization of PD,
two players must select between cooperation (C) and defection (D).
Althoughmutual cooperation generates a higher collective payoff, both
players are tempted to defect because they can do better individually by
exploiting a cooperative opponent. Without any external help, natural
selection favors mutual defection (4).
Attempts to offset the unfavorable evolutionary outcome of PD
branched into two complementary lines of research. One was spurred
by the result that in spatially structured populations, cooperators
who aggregate into clusters may avoid being wiped out by defectors
(5, 6). Subsequent interest in the role of spatial topology in this field led
to the introduction of complex networked structures (7–9) and, more
recently, to a number of experiments examining the evolution of co-operation in relation to network heterogeneity, dynamics, and updating
rules (10–13). The other line of research focused on social mechanisms,
whereby individuals rely on common knowledge about their opponents
or otherwise actively try to reduce the potential benefit of free riders.
Examples of these mechanisms include tit for tat (14), win-stay, lose-
shift (15), reputation (16), reward (17), and costly punishment (18–25).
The special attentiondevoted to costly punishment (P) as an independent
strategy partly originated from the controversial readiness of punishers
to incur a cost tomake other individuals pay an even higher fine. The
role of this strategy in the promotion of cooperation has been disputed,
with particularly negative views expressed on the basis of social
experiments (22, 24).
Much of the mentioned progress in understanding the evolution
of cooperation has been ascribed to several mechanisms that promote
cooperative behavior (26). Although the details of these mechanisms
differ greatly, they have a common basis (27–30) interpretable as the
information needed to reduce anonymity relative to a primitive, well-
mixed population (31, 32). Therefore, in the context of theoretical
hypotheses and experimental evidence (30, 33), a question of consider-
able interest arises: Would reducing the anonymity of opponents in
an actual social experiment promote cooperation?We set to answer this
question by investigating the differences between anonymous and on-
ymous treatments in a repeated PD experiment. We consider extended
PD with three strategies [cooperation (C), defection (D), and punish-
ment (P)]—as in the study of Dreber et al. (22) and in the study of
Wu et al. (24)—to further inspect the (controversial) effects of costly
punishment and to obtain richer correlations between payoffs and
the strategies used, as compared to what would be possible with tradi-
tional two-strategy PD.
A total of 154 undergraduates voluntarily participated in a repeated
PD experiment at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics (for
more details, see Materials and Methods and the Supplementary
Materials). The experiment consisted of pairwise encounters under
two treatments: anonymous (T1) and onymous (T2). In T1, each par-
ticipant interacted anonymously with opponents, whereas in T2, op-
ponents were made known. In either of the treatments, the participants
did not know how many rounds a particular interaction would have,
but they knew that the probability of entering the next round had been1 of 7
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Eset to 75%. When an interaction ended, the next set of previously
unrealized pairwise encounters was drawn randomly until all partici-
pants interacted with each other. Participants were instructed to choose
one action in each round, where actions reflected the three possible
strategies (C,D, or P). The outcomes of unilateral actions were defined
such that cooperation (C) meant paying 1 unit for the opponent to
receive 2 units, defection (D) meant gaining 1 unit at a cost of 1 unit for






nent to lose 4 units. The resulting unilateral and bilateral payoffmatrices
are given in Eq. 1



















A comparison of the results from the two experimental treatments
reveals emerging prosocial behavior under onymity (Fig. 1). We use
the term prosocial in the sense of benefiting the collective. Cooperation
is thus a prosocial action because if players in PD cooperate, then the
group payoff is maximized. Conversely, defection is an antisocial action
because defectors profit from exploiting cooperators, which in turn
decreases the group payoff. Costly (altruistic) punishment is some-
what ambiguous because its immediate effect on the payoff is negative.
However, a punisher’s presumable intention is to force a defector into
a more cooperative frame of mind and, consequently, to generate a
positive indirect effect on the group payoff. The empirical findings
do not seem to confirm this indirect effect of punishment (22, 24)—
an issue to which we devote considerable attention here. We find that
the behavior of the participants differs significantly between anony-
mous and onymous treatments (c2 test, c2 = 2233, P < 10−6). Pairwise
comparisons (Fig. 1) show an increase in the frequency of cooperation
and a decrease in the frequency of defection, both significant at the 5%
level, if anonymity is replaced with onymity. The frequency of punish-
ment also notably decreases, but the difference in the medians is not
significant. Overall, a more prosocial behavior emerges under onymity.
This conclusion is consistent with the theoretical findings, wherebyFig. 1. Onymity brings out the best in people. Cooperation takes over defec-
tion as the dominant action if the anonymous treatment (T1) is replaced with the
onymous one (T2). Pairwise comparisons indicate that the increase in the frequency
of cooperation and the decrease in the frequency of defection between the two
treatments are significant at the 5% level. The frequency of punishment decreases,
but the difference between themedians is insignificant. Box-and-whisker plots with
notches reveal the empirical distribution of the frequency of each action. Box height
indicates the interquartile range with the median in between. Notches indicate the
95% confidence intervals for themedian, thus permitting a visual pairwise comparison.
Whisker height is such that 99.3% of the normally distributed data would be covered.
The points drawn as outliers fall outside of the whisker coverage. on A
pril 12, 2018
m
ag.org/Fig. 2. Onymity elicits prosocial behavior, but punishment does not. The action in the first round (column 1st) and the first-order conditional strategies (columns C,
D, and P, indicating the responses to cooperation, defection, and punishment, respectively) in later rounds are all significantly different between the two experimental
treatments. The increase in cooperation and the decrease in defection by switching from the anonymous (T1) to the onymous (T2) treatment is particularly noticeable.
Thus, onymity elicits prosocial behavior. In contrast, an immediate response to punishment—the preferred choice being defection followed by counter-punishment—is
overwhelmingly antisocial even under onymity.2 of 7
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cooperation-promoting mechanisms—all of which preclude complete
anonymity—can sometimes change the nature of PD (selection favors
defection) to the point of eliminating the dilemma altogether (selection
favors cooperation) (31).
A closer look into participants’ behavior reveals that the action
chosen in the first-round and the first-order conditional strategies
(Fig. 2) becomes more prosocial under onymity (T2) compared to
anonymity (T1). The increase in the frequency of cooperation and
the decrease in the frequency of defection is particularly noticeable. In
contrast, the response to punishment is decisively antisocial, with defec-
tion being the preferred choice followed by counter-punishment. In T1,
punishment was countered with cooperation in less than 10% of cases.
Although the situation improved in T2, cooperation still remained the
least-preferred option. Hence, even if the intention of punishers is
ultimately prosocial, the immediate result of their action is not. Another
interesting outcome in T1 is that punishment was chosen as the first-
round action about 100% more often than in the study of Dreber et al.
(22), which is qualitatively similar to, but not as marked as, the resultWang et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1601444 29 March 2017from the study of Wu et al. (24). The large difference between the
choices in the two cited studies was attributed to the different cultural
backgrounds of participants (Boston, MA and Beijing, China, respec-
tively) (24). The same explanationmay apply to our result relative to the
study of Dreber et al. (22), given that the present experiment was also
conducted inChina. AmongChinese students, the frequency of punish-
ment in the first round dropped below 5%—the level recorded in the
Boston experiment—only after onymity had been introduced (that is, in
T2). For amore detailed comparison between the present study and the
study of Dreber et al. (22) and the study ofWu et al. (24), including the
implications for the role of punishment in increasing the degree of co-
operativeness in social dilemmas, see the Supplementary Materials.
Because of the considerable changes in the behavior of participants
between the two experimental treatments (Figs. 1 and 2), one could also
anticipatemajor differences in the payoff per round. Themedian payoff
per round of −0.319 under anonymity (T1) is significantly lower than
the corresponding value of 0.395 under onymity (T2; Wilcoxon rank







Fig. 3. Playing nice under onymity pays off. (A and B) When the opponent remains unknown (T1), the payoff per round does not correlate with the use of coop-
eration but correlates positively with the use of defection [in contrast with the study of Dreber et al. (22)], thus indicating that the prosocial action (that is, cooperation)
is less desirable than the antisocial one (that is, defection). (D and E) When the opponent is known (T2), the payoff per round correlates positively with the use of
cooperation and negatively with the use of defection, showing that the prosocial action is now more desirable than the antisocial one. (C and F) The only similarity
between the two treatments is that the payoff per round correlates negatively with the use of punishment [the “winners don’t punish” effect (22, 24)]. Shown are the regression
lines with the 95% prediction intervals (dashed curves). (G) In accompanying statistical analysis, the smaller font size indicates the 95% statistical confidence intervals.3 of 7






the choice of action and the performance of participants in terms of
the payoff per round reveals contrasting outcomes between the two
experimental treatments (Fig. 3). In T1, the payoff per round is un-
correlated with the frequency of cooperation (F test, F = 0.151, P = 0.698;
however, see regression diagnostics in the Supplementary Materials),
but it is positively correlated with the frequency of defection (F = 28.7,
P < 10−6; Fig. 3, A and B). The latter result, although in contrast with
the study of Dreber et al. (22), is not entirely surprising because in PD,
selection favors defection. Given a sufficient number of cooperators to
exploit, defectors necessarily attain a relative advantage in payoff. A
conclusion is that, under anonymity, the antisocial action may produce
a more desirable outcome in terms of the payoff per round than the
prosocial one. However, in T2, the situation is reversed. The payoff
per round becomes positively correlated with the frequency of coop-
eration (F=165,P<10−6) andnegatively correlatedwith the frequency of
defection (F = 91.0, P < 10−6; Fig. 3, D and E). Thus, onymity elicits pro-
social behavior among participants, one that also pays back—winners
play nice (Fig. 4).
The consequences of the use of punishment on the payoff per
round further corroborate the conclusion that winners play nice. We
find that the payoff per round is negatively correlated with the fre-
quency of punishment under anonymity (F = 168, P < 10−6) and even
more so under onymity (F=64.1,P< 10−6; Fig. 3, C and F). These results
are a manifestation of the “winners don’t punish” effect observed in
previous studies (22, 24).What is truly remarkable about this effect isWang et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1601444 29 March 2017its reproducibility even in the onymous treatment, which is, as we
have seen, sufficient to drastically alter the outcomes of other actions
(Fig. 4). The issue of reproducibility is an important one because not
all outcomes of previous experimental studies are readily obtained.
For instance, the frequency of punishment in the first round under
anonymity, although double that of the study of Dreber et al. (22), is
still 50% lower than the frequency found in the study of Wu et al.
(24). This difference is quantitatively large, suggesting that the cul-
tural background used to explain this result in the first placemay be a
dominant, but not the only, factor affecting the behavior of participants.
In general, confounding factors other than cultural backgroundmayhave
affected our results.We had sufficient data to analyze two of these factors,
gender and academic background. The results of these analyses are out-
lined in the Supplementary Materials. Another example of a result that
differs from previous studies is our failure to observe the increasing fre-
quency of defection with the number of rounds played (Fig. 5) (22, 24).
The reason may again be the lack of a unique underlying mechanism—
the study of Dreber et al. (22), for example, offers two possible explana-
tions as towhy the frequency of defection could increasewith the number
of rounds. The describedmismatches between the experiments highlight
the importance of understanding themechanismsbehind the statistically
significant results. Presumably, the simpler andmore stable thesemech-
anisms are, the more likely the result is to be reproducible.
We took two preliminary steps toward a more mechanistic under-
standing of the observed empirical patterns. First, we peeked into the on A
pril 12, 2018
//advances.sciencem
ag.org/Fig. 4. Onymity alters the factors of success in a social dilemma. (A and B) Under anonymity (T1), the use of cooperation does not affect the ranking, whereas the
use of defection is advantageous, albeit in a limited fashion. (D and E) Under onymity (T2), the use of cooperation is decisively advantageous for the ranking of the
participants. In contrast, the use of defection is disadvantageous. (C and F) The “winners don’t punish” effect remains unaltered between the two experimental treat-
ments. The standard competition ranking is used, such that a lower ranking number is better. The vertical axes report the average use of each action per 100 rounds.
For clarity, the scale for the use of punishment is doubled. The number of bins in the histograms is kept the same for both treatments, although the number of
participants was slightly higher in T1 than in T2 (80 versus 74, respectively), thus causing the bin sizes to slightly differ between the treatments.4 of 7
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inner workings of anonymity and onymity by comparing typical inter-
actions that, although they had started the same, ended up very differ-
ently depending on the treatment (Fig. 6). In the anonymous treatment
(T1), even those interactions that had begun with mutual cooperation,
more often than not, spiraled out of control in a series of antisocial
decisions (namely, mutual defections or retaliatory punishments). Es-
tablishing and maintaining a cooperative outcome in instances in
which the first round had consisted of decisions other than mutual
cooperation proved all the more difficult. These results are in stark
contrast with the typical interactions in the onymous treatment (T2).
Under onymity, the relationship between two opponents was often
reparable even after opening the interaction with mutual punishment.
All other first-round decisions mostly led to establishing andmaintain-
ing a cooperative outcome, provided that the interaction lasted for a
sufficient number of rounds.
As a second step toward a more mechanistic understanding of the
empirical patterns, we recreated the experiment using computer simu-
lations (see the Supplementary Materials for details). By making three
relatively straightforward assumptions, we could qualitatively and even
quantitatively reproduce the experimental results and thus obtain some
rudimentary indications of how to understand behaviorisms prompted
by a social dilemma. Specifically, first-order conditional strategies seem
to be followed on average, determining in the process whether prosocial
tendencies will be rewarded or not. There is a considerable variability
among individuals. However, overall behavior resembles the selection
of strategies by trial and error, themain purpose of which seems to be




In conclusion, onymity entices cooperation. To solidify this conclusion,
we performed two additional control trials, one under anonymous and
the other under onymous conditions (see the Supplementary Materials
for details), wherein participants played a more traditional 2 × 2 PDFig. 5. Frequency of cooperation, defection, and punishment over the
course of an interaction. (A) In the anonymous treatment (T1), action frequen-
cies do not show a statistically discernible trend as the interaction progresses,
thus contrasting the results in the study of Dreber et al. (22) and in the study
of Wu et al. (24). (B) In the onymous treatment (T2), the frequency of cooperation
(defection) seems to be decreasing (increasing), but again, the results are statis-
tically insignificant. Shown are the data points (circles, squares, and x marks for
cooperation, defection, and punishment, respectively) and the regression lines.
The latter were simultaneously fitted to ensure that the frequencies add up to
unity. (C) In the accompanying statistical analysis, the smaller font size indicates
the 95% statistical confidence intervals. We additionally tested whether the angle
between the regression lines for cooperation and defection was significantly dif-
ferent from zero, but we obtained a negative result (P = 0.58 and P = 0.072 for T1
and T2, respectively). A
pril 12, 2018Fig. 6. Same beginnings but vastly different endings. Inner workings of anonymity and onymity through a direct comparison of some typical interactions that
finished differently although they started the same. (A) In the anonymous treatment, even mutual cooperation occasionally gives way to defection and punishment.
Other initial decisions make it only harder to reach and maintain a cooperative outcome. (B) In the onymous treatment, in contrast, even mutual preemptive pun-
ishment is reparable. Other initial decisions make it mostly easier to reach and maintain a cooperative outcome.5 of 7









game without punishment. Qualitatively similar results were obtained
in these control trials, thus more firmly establishing the position of
onymity as a powerful promoter of cooperation. Further quantitative
comparisons between the controls and treatments T1 and T2 indicated
that punishment, at best, failed in increasing the degree of cooperative-
ness among participants. However, an even more important result is
that the level of cooperationmay be sufficient tomake onymous pro-
social behavior advantageous—winners play nice. The conclusion that
winners play nice under onymity is a major step forward from the
previous studies in, at least, a twofoldmanner. The study ofDreber et al.
(22), for example, establishes that successful individuals in an un-
favorably structured social dilemma (of which PD is a prime example)
avoid punishing others. This finding is complemented by our results
because when the cloak of anonymity is removed, successful individuals
should aspire to more than just staying shy of punishing others—they
should behave truly prosocially and cooperate in the face of a strong
temptation to defect. Furthermore, Wu et al. (24) report how costly
punishment fails to increase cooperation. Although this result is
interesting in itself, we actually offer a potential remedy for situations
in which punishment has failed. Overall, the results are supportive of a
notion that for cooperative behavior to emerge, opponents need some
information about each other. This notionmay havemajor implications
for theoretical studies seeking mechanisms that promote cooperation.
Instead of scouring an endless landscape of possible scenarios, the focus
may shift toward available information for mutual recognition (27–30).
At present, for instance, what degree of onymity effectively supports
cooperation remains an interesting unknown.
Throughout the experimental sessions, we operationalized onymity
simply by allowing opponents to learn each other’s name. However, for
this to be effective, we relied on the fact that participants were students
who had attended the same classes before. Thus, our sample exhibited
two important characteristics that suggest a rather high level of onymity.
One characteristic is that students had previous knowledge about one
another, and the other is homogeneity in terms of age and interests,
making mutual recognition and association relatively easy. This high
level of onymity bears the question: To what extent could onymity be
lowered and still promote cooperation? Although an answer is beyond
the scope of the present study, we envisioned setups that would allow
rigorous experimentation in this direction. For example, recruits need
not be acquaintances before the experiment (nor do they have to orig-
inate from the same social groups) yet might be required to introduce
themselves to others and even spend some time having a conversation
about a given topic. This experimental design would certainly preclude
complete anonymity, but neither mutual recognition nor association
would be as easy as in the experiments presented here.
As with any experimental study, there is a danger in extrapolating
the results outside the narrow set of controlled conditions and param-
eters prevalent during the experiment. We already highlighted several
important differences between this and previous comparable studies,
thereby hinting at plausible behavioral determinants operating in the
face of a social dilemma (for example, cultural background). Aside from
the cultural background, a slew of economic (for example, income and
wealth) and biological (for example, age and gender) parameters may
also play an important role, begging the question how robust the results
of experimental studies truly are. It is somewhat encouraging in this
context that computer simulations built on a small set of straightforward
assumptions successfully reproduce the experimental results. These
simulations justify our focus on the first-order conditional strategies in
interpreting the raw data, but they fall short of explaining what over-Wang et al., Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1601444 29 March 2017rides are triggered by onymity in order for defection in T1 to be replaced
with cooperation in T2. At present, we can only speculate that partici-
pants anticipate to be reciprocated for prosocial actions under onymity
despite being unable to spread rumors or to interact more than once (a
few PD rounds) with any given individual.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Experimental methods
Wegathered 154 voluntary undergraduate students (49.4%women and
50.6% men, mean age of 21.6; for more details, see the Supplementary
Materials) from three universities in Kunming, China, who major in
mathematics (55 people), statistics (39 people), and eight other, mostly
social sciences and humanities (60 people). Participants engaged in a
repeated PD experiment at the computer laboratory of Statistics and
Mathematics School, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics,
consisting of around 100 isolated computer cubicles running z-Tree
(34). A cubicle was randomly assigned to each participant, who would
then read instructions about experimental procedures and have the
understanding thereof tested via a questionnaire (fig. S1). Any two par-
ticipants were separated by a vacant cubicle to help two supervisors,
who could answer technical questions too, maintain order.
The experiment consisted of six sessions—three per treatment—
which took place on 6 September, 11 October, and 15 November 2014
for the anonymous (T1; 26.7 participants per session) andon20September,
25 October, and 8 November 2014 for the onymous treatment (T2;
24.7). Each session began with a practice interaction, followed by a
series of interactions in which every participant interacted with ev-
eryone else in a random order. An interaction meant that a pair of
opponents repeatedly faced the same PD, where the next round would
occur with 75% probability. Participants in both treatments had half
a minute to inspect the result of the preceding round and their total
payoff. Furthermore, in T2, participants—strictly classmates—could
see each other’s name. Sessions lasted approximately 1.25 hours. No
participant engaged in multiple sessions.
As an incentive, in addition to a ¥15 show-up fee, all participants
started with an initial score of 50 points, and it was explained that their
final score, if positive, would be exchanged for a real currency at the rate
of ¥0.2 per point. This setup generated the average earnings of ¥18.5,
ranging from ¥15.0 to ¥31.6.
Statistical methods and analyses
To get a sense of how the use of strategies (C, D, or P) is distributed
without referring to a model distribution (for example, the normal
distribution), we resorted to nonparametric descriptive statistics, that
is, the median and the interquartile range. Subsequently, a direct com-
parison of the differences in the use of strategies between the two treat-
ments (T1 and T2) was made on the basis of the median’s 95%
confidence intervals. The first-order conditional strategies were naturally
represented by means of 3 × 2 contingency tables, where table rows
(columns) corresponded to C, D, and P (T1 and T2). Whether the strat-
egies are independent of the treatments was tested with c2 test. Using this
test was justified by a large number of data points at our disposal.
The correlation between the payoff per round and the use of strate-
gies was analyzed with ordinary least-squares regression and outlier
detection methods, as presented in the study of Chatterjee and Hadi
(35). Outlier detection was performed in conjunction with the tests of
normality for residuals to identify instances in which a few data points
had the potential to overwhelmingly affect the statistical inference. In6 of 7
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Econtrast, in correlating the use of strategies with the number of rounds
played, we used a custom-built regression routine for two reasons. First,
the sum of the three strategies always equaled unity, implying a con-
straint that needed to be taken into account. Second, we used resam-
pling (that is, bootstrapping) of the residuals because no indication of
their true distribution was available from a low number of data points.D
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